

TOP SECRET

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14 December 1949

CIA 36015

DRAFT OF A MEMO TO THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF NSC

SUBJECT: Particular Intelligence Questions Requiring Coordination or Attention

REFERENCE: (a) Section 4 e (2) of NSC 50
(b) Memorandum to Director, 8 July 1949 from Executive Secretary, National Security Council

✓ Section 4 of NSC 50 lists particular intelligence questions requiring coordination or attention, and requests the Director of Central Intelligence to submit to the Council within six months a report of progress in these matters.

1. Scientific Intelligence. On January 1, 1949 an Office of Scientific Intelligence was established as one of the major offices in the Central Intelligence Agency. (Before that, it was a section of OSA). This office is being well staffed and is now devoting its time to matters of scientific intelligence in conjunction with other offices of the Government interested in this subject. DCI Directive 3/3, based on NSCID 3, was finally issued with IAC concurrence on October 28, 1949, establishing an interdepartmental Scientific Intelligence Committee to plan, support, and coordinate production of scientific intelligence as it affects the National Security.

2. Domestic Intelligence. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is now on the Intelligence Advisory Committee so that domestic intelligence and related matters will be coordinated with foreign intelligence matters. The Office of Special Operations in the Central Intelligence Agency is working closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on matters where their respective interests are related.

3. Crisis Situations. On February 2, 1949, at a regular meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, it was agreed to expedite the handling of intelligence matters when there were crisis situations. To confirm this agreement in writing, it is hoped that a directive on this subject may be issued

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this month, after agreement has been reached with the agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

4. Political Summaries. As the intelligence facility of the National Security Council and the President, the Central Intelligence Agency must continually and systematically report all developments, political, economic, military, and otherwise, which materially affect or have a bearing upon United States national security and objectives abroad. While CIA's Daily and Weekly Summaries are based to a considerable degree upon Department of State materials, the major cause for this situation derives from the fact that the Department of State makes their highest level intelligence and operational materials which have utility for intelligence purposes available to the Central Intelligence Agency whereas the Departments of Army, Navy and Air do not. It is hoped that this situation will be improved. Moreover, in periods of relative peace, the bulk of intelligence is of a political and economic, rather than military, nature. The Central Intelligence Agency's intelligence summaries are the only ones designed primarily for the President and the National Security Council. Each departmental intelligence agency is authorized to and should produce such current publications as are required to meet their own departmental needs.

5. Exploitation of Foreign Nationality Groups and Individuals. This work is being undertaken as follows:

a. Foreign Radio Broadcasts Within the U.S.: A recent survey shows that 131 radio stations in the U. S. broadcast to Foreign Nationality Groups in 39 languages. Authorized transmitter power is so low that only 5% of these stations, covering 10 languages,

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The foreign intelligence


potential of these stations is considered of such little value that, even if NSCID No. 6 were amended to permit coverage, the diversion from foreign broadcasts is considered uneconomical.

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b. Foreign Language Publications Within the U.S.: Whereas the foreign intelligence potential of the 733 publications was considered negligible during the war years, a continuing survey shows an increasing tendency to employ foreign correspondents which enhances their intelligence potential. At present six publications of this type receive regular screening.

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6. Covert Intelligence in Occupied Areas. Action has been taken with the Intelligence Division, OSSUSA, to effect a closer coordination of such activity, which has resulted in appreciable improvement in the situation and a substantial increase of coordination in both the Far Eastern and European Areas. It could be improved still further if NSCINs 2 and 5 were revised to centralize the responsibility for the coordination and procurement of all covert intelligence in the hands of the Director of Central Intelligence, both in occupied areas and all other areas outside the United States and its possessions, and to more specifically limit the exceptions to the allocated responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of all federal espionage and counter-espionage outside the United States and its possessions.

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7. Defectors. For over a year, this subject has been under consideration by the interested agencies. After much discussion and revision, a proposed NSCID was compiled on "Exploitation of Defectors and Other Aliens Within the United States" and circulated in December to the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies for the usual approval before submitting it to the National Security Council. A corollary proposal on the "Exploitation of Soviet and Satellite Defectors Outside the United States" was also submitted to the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies. It is hoped that both proposals will soon be approved by the IAC so that they may be submitted to the NSC as proposed NSCIDs for early issuance.

Until these over-all policy directives are established and put in operation, there is functioning a Pro Tem Interdepartmental Working Committee to handle problems on the important cases of defectors which arise and which have accumulated to date. It is hoped that before long the over-all directives will be approved and issued, so that the Pro Tem work of this nature may be discontinued and this work placed on a firmer and more regular basis.

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8. Counter-espionage Activities Abroad, and Closer Liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Special Operations has placed increased stress on its counter-espionage functions and on counter-espionage activity abroad on a continuing basis. As pointed out in Section 6 above, it would be helpful to have in an amended NSCID 5 greater clarity for coordination in the counter-espionage field to help the central

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Intelligence Agency more effectively fulfill its counter-espionage mission.

The Office of Special Operations' liaison and cooperation attendant thereon with the Federal Bureau of Investigation have increased effectively over a considerable period of time. Obviously, the closest possible working relationship is not only highly desirable but also necessary to developing the closest possible counter-espionage liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Central Intelligence Agency feels that this liaison relationship at the present time is close, effective, and mutually advantageous.

cc: Exec.
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